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IN LOCO PARENTIS IN TOE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: ABU·SED, 
CONFUSED, . IN NEED OF C . GE 
Susan Stuart* 
[T]o kill an error is as good a service as, and sometimes even better than, 
the establishing a new truth or fact. 
-Charles Darwin 1 
In loco parentis is a common law doctrine that has been used to 
characterize the on-campus relationship between a school and its 
students, but its abuse has led to such absurd cases as Safford Unified 
School District No.1 v. Redding .. Although. waning in higher education, 
the doctrine is experiencing a resurgence in elementary and secondary 
schools. As originally conceived, the doctrine was used primarily to 
justify and defend student disciplinary actions: the school stood in the 
shoes of the parent and had authority to discipline, almost .at will. The 
doctrine, however, never seemed to have a corollary in the schools' 
responsibility for students' safety. Now, in loco parentis is being 
reenergized to excuse violating student rights, particularly with 
degrading treatment in matters of search and seizure, but with little or 
no concomitant recognition of any responsibility to protect students 
from equally degrading treatment occasioned by sexual harassment and 
bullying. This Article discusses why this doctrine is being revived and 
why that revival is misguided. Part of the blame lies with courts' and 
schools' in.ability to articulate some other, more modern justification for 
school disciplinary policies. A larger portion of the blame, however, 
lies both with a careless political process that is tasking schools with 
more than just an educational function and with an equally careless 
judiciary that believes in loco parentis means Hit's none of our 
business. " Instead, education professionals can and should be 
exploring an institutional model of their relationship with students in 
both the treatment of and duties toward their civil rights. 
* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School ofLaw. Many thanks to the participants at 
the Summer 2009 Oxford Roundtable where this thesis was first presented; to Bill Horvath, my trusty 
. . 
research assistant; and to Ivan Bodensteiner for his ability to get me to focus. 
1. 2 CHARLES DARWIN, MORE LETTERS OF CHARLES DARWIN 422 (Francis Darwin & A. C. 
Seward eds. 1903) (Letter 752 to A. Stephen Wilson, March 5, 1879). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the evolution of law, perhaps one of the greatest anomalies is the 
continuing vitality of the doctrine of in loco parentis in education law. 
Meaning "in the place of a parent," the doctrine would ordinarily be 
understood to require the guardianship qualities of a parent, as being 
supportive, protective, and perhaps disciplinary. When the doctrine is 
applied in public schools, most courts have focused almost solely on the 
disciplinary aspect of the principle without considering its concomitant 
protective responsibilities. At some point during the late twentieth 
century, courts began to revisit the viability of in loco parentis in the 
modem, state-run institutions of present-day public schools and turned 
to a more realistic legal analysis of the school-child relationship. 
Lately, however, in loco parentis has experienced an inexplicable 
resurgence that seems designed primarily to protect school districts from 
the responsibility for unwise and otherwise indefensible search and 
seizure policies disguised as disciplinary decisions. 
There may be several reasons for this trend, not the least of which is 
the authoritarian tendencies of the current U.S. Supreme Court,2 which 
might side with the unquestioned authority of school boards and 
administrators to manage their school districts. This unfortunate state of 
affairs is multifaceted, but this Article demonstrates the unsuitability of 
in loco parentis as a legal doctrine in schools, first, because it was never 
properly implemented by the courts in the United States and, second, 
because its continued existence is no longer appropriate to the modem 
needs of public education. 3 
When courts first started using in loco parentis as a justification 
defense for schools, they used it as a descriptive word of convenience 
because they never really adopted the entirety of the doctrine. From its 
origins in U.S. public education law, the common law doctrine of in loco 
parentis was applied almost exclusively to student discipline. Rarely 
was it understood to also apply to parental-like responsibilities for the 
care of students. Consequently, in loco parentis was a misnomer for 
something other than the doctrine was intended and was applied in other 
arenas, such as higher education. 
2. See, e.g., Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND. L.J. 379, 434 47 
( 1991 ); Susan Stuart, Shibboleths and Ceballos: Eroding Constitutional Rights Through 
Pseudocommunication, 2008 BYU L. REv. 1545, 1552-57 (2008). 
3. This Article's scope does not develop a thorough examination of an obligation of public 
schools to provide support and protection to students the flip-side to the disciplinary use of in loco 
parentis. That topic will be addressed in a later article related to the increasing intrusiveness of student 
searches. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009) (middle school 
student improperly strip-searched for prescription·strength ibuprofen). 
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Second, even if properly adopted, in loco parentis was never designed 
to be or understood as a concept that would apply to the system of state-
run schools in the United States. In loco parentis assumes a voluntary 
delegation of parental authority and was envisioned during a time of 
either home-schooling tutors or small residential, private schools. The 
doctrine is now anachronistic in an era of involuntary delegation 
occasioned by compulsory attendance laws and of large public schools 
with responsibilities that often go beyond educational function. As a 
consequence, courts started to drift away from in loco parentis, and it 
may well have died a natural death, especially with the decisions in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District4 and New 
Jersey v. TL.0. 5 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court intervened and 
halted at least temporarily what would ordinarily be a quiet, natural, 
and uneventful death of a species that deserved to be extinct. 
A body of legal scholarship discourses on various evolutionary 
theories about the law.6 "Today the idea that law 'evolves' is so deeply 
ingrained in Anglo-American legal thought that most lawyers are no 
longer even conscious of it as a metaphor."7 A burgeoning field of 
study posits that the formation of law is evolutionary in and of itself and 
that there is fruitful inquiry into this field as a construct of cultural 
evolution: "[B]ehavioral research with genetic implications~" 8 Most 
pertinent here is perhaps Holmes's "doctrinal" approach to evolution in 
the law:9 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, 
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices 
which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to 
do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
4. 393 u.s. 503 ( 1969). 
5. 469 u.s. 325 ( 1985). 
6. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living Constitution, 61 V AND. L. REV. 1319 
(2008); E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 38 (1985); 
M.B.W. Sinclair, Evolution in Law: Second Thoughts, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 31 (1993); see also 
Jan Vetter, The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 CAL. L. REV. 343 (1984). 
7. Elliott, supra note 6, at 38. 
8. E. Adamson Hoebel, Anthropology, Law and Genetic Inheritance, in LAW, BIOLOGY & 
CULTURE: THE EVOLUTION OF LAW 27, 28 (Margaret Gruter & Paul Bohannon eds., 1983). Legal 
anthropology as a research field has focused, in many respects, on those characteristics of the law that 
one might find in any ordinary law review article: "the nature of norn1s, dispute handling processes, 
sanctions, authority and levels of hierarchy within a social system to which any body of law may apply." 
/d. at 31; see, e.g., John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr, Legal Anthropology Comes Home: A Brief 
History of the Ethnographic Study of Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 41 (1993); Elliott, supra note 6, at 71-
90; Anne Griffiths, Law, Space, and Place: Re.framfng Comparative Law and Legal Anthropology, 34 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 495 (2009). 
9. Elliott, supra note 6, at 50. 
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governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through 
many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the 
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to know what 
it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become. We 
must alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation. But 
the most difficult labor will be to understand the combination of the two 
. d 10 Into new pro ucts at every stage. 
Although law is affected by judges' conscious choices as they make 
and define the law, 11 the law does evolve, even if that evolution is 
merely a metaphor for the change that law experiences. 12 In this 
context, in loco parentis was never adaptable to the common school 
tradition of the United States, and consequently, it could not evolve. 
And it should have been allowed to die years ago. 
To support that thesis, this Article addresses both the history of and 
the flaws in the in loco parentis doctrine in education law. First, this 
Article examines both the historical origins and judicial reliance on the 
in loco parentis doctrine, primarily in the United States. It then 
addresses the inherent fallacy of relying on the doctrine, especially in 
contemporary education law cases. Last, this Article explores the better 
alternative professional education standards as being much better 
measures of school districts' duties and responsibilities because they 
provide better normative standards for courts to compare than the 
loosely descriptive in loco parentis doctrine. Ultimately, this Article 
expostulates that the in loco parentis doctrine should be put out of its 
misery: if courts will not allow it to go the way of the dodo, then it will 
have to be eradicated like the ubiquitous kudzu. 
II. WHAT'S OLD Is NEW AGAIN 
The report of my death was an exaggeration. 
-Mark Twain 13 
The origins of the in loco parentis doctrine are murky. It may go 
back as far as the Code of Hatmnurabi through ancient Roman times to 
10. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881); see also Elliott, supra note 6, 
at SO. 
11. Elliott, supra note 6, at 54. 
12. !d. at 90. "We speak of the law 'adapting' to its social, cultura], and technological 
environment without the slightest awareness of the jurisprudential tradition we are invoking." !d. at 38. 
13. Mark Twain quotations- Death, http://www.twainquotes.com/Death.html (last visited Apr. 
5, 2010). 
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the present. 14 The Latinism, in loco parentis, translates as "in the place 
of a parent.~' 15 It is not to be confused with parens patriae, which 
means "parent of his or her country." 16 While in loco parentis describes 
the relationship of an individual who has the care and custody of 
children in the place of the children's parents, the parental role ascribed 
to parens patriae is undertaken by a govermnent to care for those who 
cannot care for themselves, such as children and the infirn1. 17 An 
individual may be the parent or in loco parentis to a child, but the state 
can step in to protect the child from the parent if need be, like an tiber-
parent. 18 This situation reveals the inherent clash between the notion 
that the state can be in loco parentis to schoolchildren yet still act as 
parens patriae. This clash is like the fox guarding the chicken coop at 
what point will the state police itself in its parens patriae role if it is 
failing in its in loco parentis role? 
This label of in loco parentis is still applied to any person or entity 
standing in a guardian-type position in the place of a parent. 19 In that 
circumstance, using the term presupposes that the guardian will act like 
a parent in all respects. For some reason, however, this term has become 
most closely identified with education law and has gained an unexpected 
life of its own by meaning something other than its commonly 
14. Alan F. Edwards, Jr., In Loco Parentis: Alive and Kicking. Dead and Buried, or Rising 
Phoenix? 2 (Educ. Res. Info. Ctr Doc. #375720, 1994), available at 
http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_Ol/0000019b/80/l3/64/1a.pdf. 
15. Perry A. Zirkel & Henry F. Reichner, Is the In Loco Parentis Doctrine Dead? 15 J.L. & 
EDUC. 271, 271 {1986); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 858 (9th ed. 2009). Black's Law Dictionary 
provides the following definition: "Of, relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a 
child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent." /d. A person acting in loco parentis 
"acts in place of a parent, either temporarily ... or indefinitely .. . has assumed the obligations of a 
parent without forn1ally adopting the child." /d. at 1257 ("person in loco parentis,'). 
16. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 15, at 1221. 
17. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 271 n.1; Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a 
Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children's 
Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 381 (2000); Gregory Thomas, Limitations on Parens Patriae: The 
State and the Parent/Child Relationship, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 5 I, 51 (2007). 
18. Scott A. Davidson, Note, When Is Parental Discipline Child Abuse? The Vagueness of Child 
Abuse Laws, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 403,406 (1996) ("Because of the child's natural dependency 
on his or her parents, the state has a superior right to protect the child when that dependency threatens 
the child's well-being."). 
19. As of June, 2009, the following federal statutes use the tet n1inology in loco parentis: 5 
U.S.C. § 6381 (2006 & Supp. II. 2008) (Family & Medical Leave Act); id. § 81 02a (Compensation for 
Work Injuries); 8 U.S.C. § 1232 (Aliens & Nationality); 10 U.S.C. §§ 1126, 1477, 1482 (Anned 
Forces); 18 U.S.C. §§ 115, 879, 1116 (Crimes & Criminal Procedure); 20 U.S.C. §§ 932, 1232h, 7801, 
9402 (Education); 22 U.S.C. §§ 213, 2708 (Foreign Relations); 25 U.S.C. § 231 (Indians); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 2611 (Labor); 33 U.S.C. § 902 (Navigation & Navigable Waters); 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 411f> 41th (Pay 
& Allowances ofthe Unifonned Services); 38 U.S.C. § 1901 (Veterans' Benefits); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 
1437d, 1437f, 2000c-6, 2000d, 2000e, 9858n (Public Health & Welfare). If one searches the online 
legal retrieval systems, one finds there is nearly the same number of federal regulations using the term. 
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understood definition. 
William Blackstone's Commentaries is usually cited as the common 
law source of the edict that schools stand in the shoes of the parent: 
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his 
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, 
and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, 
viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the 
purposes for which he is employed. 20 
Although Blackstone cited to no legal authority for this common law 
proposition, 21 contemporary researchers infer that his sources were 
Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, and Mills, primarily for antecedents of a 
father;s p.ower to control his children: 22 
Part of the parental task of raising children to be responsible adults 
consists in making rules for them, and part of the task of making rules 
includes the power to enforce those rules where necessary . . . . Others 
are not allowed to take it upon themselves to discipline children, except in 
those situations in which they occupy some other guardian-like role in 
relation to those children, such as teachers, and even in those 
circumstances the power is in loco parentis. 23 . 
Note that even contemporary res.earchers are attributing only the 
parental right of discipline to in loco parentis powers of teachers. But a 
close and literal reading of Blackstone should highlight that he joined in 
loco parentis with discipline; he did not extract discipline as the only 
portion of in loco parentis that applied to the teacher nor did he divest 
teachers of their overarching guardianship responsibilities, especially 
given the historical context. 
Nevertheless, this narrow interpretation of Blackstone's common law 
persisted (and still ,persists) that Blackstone meant that teachers have 
only disciplinary powers and such narrow interpretation profoundly 
shaped the early legal doctrine as a defense of justification in school 
20. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_centurylblackstone_bklch16.asp; see· William G. Buss, Procedural Due 
Process for School Discipline~· Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545, 559 (1971); 
Todd A. DeMitchell, The Duty to Protect: Blackstone's Doctrine of In Loco Parentis: A Lens for 
Viewing the Sexual Abuse of Students, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 17; 18-19 (2002); John C. Hogan & 
Mortimer D. Schwartz, In Loco Parentis in the United States 1765-1985, 8 J. LEGAL HISTORY 260, 260 
(1987); Brian Jackson, Note, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An Historical Survey and 
Proposal for Refonn, 44 V AND. L. REV. 1135, 1144 ( 1991 ); Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 2 71. 
21 ., BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at * 441; Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 2 71 n.4. 
22. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20; at 260. The "core context" for in loco parentis is student 
discipline, or "restraint and correction." Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 273. 
23. Arthur Ripstein, Closing the Gap, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 61, 85 n.36 (2008). 
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discipline cases, particularly when corporal punishment was involved. 24 
The doctrine "was readily imported from England as protection for 
public school teachers who saw the need to corporally punish students in 
the[i]r charge. This protection took the form of a broad, although not 
unlimited, defense in criminal and civil suits for assault and battery."25 
In the 1837 case of State v. Pendergrass26 deemed the earliest U.S. 
case applying the in loco parentis principle the State of North Carolina 
charged a schoolmistress with assault and b,attery for having applied a 
switch to a seven-year-old female student.27 Although not denoted by 
its Latinism, the in loco parentis principle was the rationale for the 
court's determination· that the schoolmistress's authority to impose 
discipline in the form of corporal punishment derived from the 
delegation of parental authority: 
It is not easy to state with precision, the power which the law grants to 
schoolmasters and teachers, with respect to the correction of their pupils. 
It is analogous to that which belongs to parents; and the authority of the 
teacher is regarded as a delegation of parental authority. One of the most 
sacred duties of parents, is to train up and qualify their children, for 
becoming useful and virtuous members of society; this duty cannot be 
effectually performed without the ability to command obedience, to 
control stubbornness, to quicken diligence, and to reform bad habits; and 
to enable him to exercise this salutary sway, he is armed with the power 
to administer moderate correction, when he shall believe it to be just and 
necessary. The teacher is the substitute of the parent; is charged in part 
with the performance of his duties, and in the exercise of these delegated 
duties, is invested with his power.28 
The Pendergrass court clearly acknowledged a great discretion 
bestowed upon teachers that was nearly parallel to a court's refusal to 
interfere in the parent-child relationship. 29 
24. See Buss, supra note 20, at 559-60. 
25. Zirkel & Reichn.er, supra note 15, at 273. 
26. State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (1837). 
27. /d.; Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 262. 
28. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. at 365-66. Th~ schoolmistress's conviction was overturned on ,appeal, 
as a matter of law, because the injuries inflicted on the child were only temporary and the 
schoolmistress's motivation was not activated by malice. /d. at 367-68. Note that the Pendergrass 
opinion discussed affinnative tutelary duties in addition to the disciplinary power delegated to effectuate 
a child's education. Later de,cisions ignored the affinnative tutelary duty in favor of emphasizing the 
disciplinary power. 
29. See also Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 273. An Alabama court "cited the [in loco 
parentis] doctrine as clothing the teacher with the parent's delegated authority to discipline the pupil to 
the same-extent that they cou1d do so themselves." /d. Also keep in mind that contemporary law did not 
afford much protection for children. At about the same time the Pendergrass case was appealed so was 
the case of Mary Conner. When Mary attempted to discipline her teenage son for failing to follow her 
instructions, she threw a fire poker at him. Her teenage son evaded the poker, but it killed her five-year-
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For well over a century, cases applying in loco parentis ,as a legal 
doctrine were confined nearly exclusively to corporal punishment cases~ 
One path of this application established that teachers had wide discretion 
to punish students as a matter of law, constrained only if the students 
sustained serious injuries. 30 That path is nearly extinct. The other path 
of the doctrine regards teacher discretion ,as a question of fact whereby a 
trier-of-fact could determine the reasonableness of the punishment; this 
path survives today in those jurisdictions that still allow teachers to 
administer corporal punishment. 3 1 This other path also signaled the 
narrowing of a teacher's discretion, as Blackstone proposed, to the 
purposes for which the teacher is employed, i.e., within the limits of the 
teacher's responsibility and jurisdiction. 32 
The Supreme Court summarized the "modern'' view of in loco 
parentis in 1977: 
At common law a single principle has governed the use of corporal 
punishment since before the American Revolution: Teachers may impose 
reasonable but not excessive force to discipline a child. Blackstone 
catalogued among the "absolute rights of individuals" the right ''to 
security from the corporal insults of menaces, assaults, beating, and 
wounding," but he did not regard it a '"corporal insult'' for a teacher to 
inflict "moderate correction'' on a child in his care. To the extent that 
force was "necessary to answer the purposes for which (the teacher) is 
employed," Blackstone viewed it as 'Justifiable or lawful." The basic. 
doctrine has not changed. The prevalent rule in this country today 
privileges such force as a teacher or administrator ''reasonably believes to 
be necessary for (the child's) proper control, training, or education." To 
the extent that the force is excessive or unreasonable, the educator in 
virtually all States is subject to possible civil and criminal liability. 33 
oJd child. Mary was convicted of manslaughter, but the mitigating circumstances reduced her penalty to 
a shilling. Rex v. Conner, (1836) 173 Eng. Rep. 194, 195; Kandice, K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: 
The Parental Corporal Punishment Defense- Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?~ 1998 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 413,414 (1998). 
30. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 274. 
31. /d. at 275-76. 
All pf the circumstances are· to be- taken into account in detennining whether the 
punishment is reasonable in a particular case. Among the most important considerations 
are the seriousness of the offense, the attitude and past behavior of the child, the nature 
and severity of the punishment,-the age and strength of the child, and the availability of 
less severe but equally effective means of discipline. 
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977); see Zirkel & Reichner~ supra note 15, at 275-76; see 
also Buss, supra note 20, at 561-62. 
32. Zirkel & Reichner~ supra note 15, at 275. 
33. Ingraham; 430 U.S. at 661 (footnotes & citations omitted). ln setting out this principle in 
Ingraham, the Court relied on the Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 147(2), which configured the in loco 
• 
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The Court, however, added a modem twist to its version of in loco 
parentis that Blackstone had not included, that an additional raison 
d'etre for a teacher's disciplinary power is "the maintenance of group 
discipline."34 This new language departed from the traditional notion of 
parental delegation of authority over one's own child only, and its 
acceptance in a modernized version of in loco parentis explains to a 
certain extent the doctrine's lingering life. 
By the mid-1980s, scholars were tolling the death knell of in loco 
parentis in public education. 35 In higher education, in loco parentis 
likely w,as breathing its last By the 1960s, colleges and universities had 
to scale back their ability to control their students through the in loco 
parentis doctrine. 36' In contrast, in loco parentis still had strong 
adherents in public education through the mid-1980s, in different 
jurisdictions and in different types of cases. And it likely remains as 
strong as ever in some of those pockets, such as those states that 
continue to allow corporal punishment 37 It maintains its current 
presence, however, predominately as a rationale for relaxing the Fourth 
Amendment protections for student searches and for stifling First 
Amendment freedom of student speech. 
Student searches were justified as long ago as 1930, when in loco 
parentis was invoked as a defense when one teacher strip-searched a 
teenage girl, looking for money stolen from another teacher. 38 The 
appellate court ruled the jury should have been instructed properly on 
the parameters of in loco parentis and the teacher's authority: whether 
the search was done lawfully for purposes of the child's educational 
training (in loco parentis) or unlawfully for the purpose of retrieving 
parentis disciplinary power as follows: 
(2) One other than a parent who has been given by law or has voluntarily assumed in 
whoJe or in part the function of controlling, training, or educating a child, is privileged to 
·. 
apply such reasonable force or to impose such reasonable confinement as he reasonably 
believes to be necessary for its proper control, training, or education, except in so far as 
the parent has restricted the privilege of one to whom he has entrusted the child. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 147(2) (1965). 
34. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 662. 
35. See Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 269-70; see generally Zirkel & Reichner, supra 
note 15. 
36. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 281-82; DAVID A. HOEKEMA, CAMPUS RULES AND 
MORAL COMMUNITY: IN PLACE OF IN LOCO PARENTIS 12-13,28-31 (1994); see generally Peter F. Lake, 
The Rise of Duty and the Fall of In Loco Parentis and Other Protective Tort Doctrines in Higher 
Education, 64 Mo. L. REV. I (1999). 
37. See, e.g., Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 57 Cal. Rptr. 3d 454, 464-66 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007). 
38. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 276. The girl was forced to remove her outer clothing 
and her bloomers in search of the money that was allegedly stolen. 
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money belonging to a third person (not in loco parentis).39 Student 
search jurisprudence was quiescent until 1969, when a California court 
ruled that in loco parentis authorized a vice principal's search of a 
student locker for drugs because he stood in the shoes of the parent and 
could use similar "moderate force to obtain obedience" as the parent 
could. 40 The doctrine then took on a life of its own as schools became 
increasingly concerned about drugs on campus. 
Through a number of permutations, the in loco parentis doctrine 
eventually changed the balance between schools and their students' 
Fourth Amendment privacy rights,41 culminating in New Jersey v. 
T.L.O, where a school official searched a student's purse and found 
marijuana and related paraphernalia. 42 In that case, the Supreme Court 
addressed two primary issues that were intertwined with the in loco 
parentis doctrine. First, the Court held that school officials cannot 
shield themselves from constitutional analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment by arguing that, by reason of in loco parentis; they are 
private actors like parents: "In carrying out searches and other 
disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies, school officials act as 
representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for the parents, and 
they cannot claim the parents' immunity from the strictures of the 
Fourth Amendment.'·'43 Having disposed of the in loco parentis doctrine 
to hold school officials are state actors, the Court had a vacuum to fill: 
there was no established rationale for school disciplinary power other 
than in loco parentis. As a consequence, the Court needed a reason to 
allow schools to invade students' Fourth Amendment privacy rights, 
especially searches, while foregoing the need for warrants and probable 
39. Phillips v. Johns, 12 Tenn. App. 354, 355-56 (Tenn. Ct. App. l930). 
40. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 265; In, re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 223 (CaL Ct. 
App. 1969). The California ,court ultimately held that the vice principal was not a government official 
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment so his search was not proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. /d. 
at 222. That holding is no longer good law. In re William G., 709 P.2d 1287, 1293 (CaL 1985); see also 
infra notes 42 44 & accompanying text; Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 276-78. 
41. See Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 266--69; Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 276-
77; In Interest of L.L., 280 N.W.2d 343, 349-50 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). The primary modus operandi 
was that school officials need not have probable cause to search students and their belongings and 
lockers. All that was necessary was a reasonab]e, suspicion that a student possessed an illegal or 
dangerous item. /d. at 351-52. 
42. 469 U.S. 325 (1985); see also Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 269; Zirkel & Reichner, 
supra note 15, at 277-78. 
43. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336-37. In its analysis, the Court emphasized that "parenta1 delegation" 
was not an appropriate source of school authority because of compulsory ,attendance laws. Furthermore, 
schools exercise- public authority when engaging in student searches in light of Court precedent 
requiring that they similarly exercise public authority under the First Amendment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. /d. at 336 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S.503 (1969); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)). 
. . 
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cause.44 
The test the Court developed certainly departed from the in loco 
parentis doctrine of disciplining students. The Court's test "balanc[es] 
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails,'' 
juxtaposing. the students' Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy 
against the state's need for order.45 This regime rested on the modem 
institutional premise of 
the substantial interest of teachers and administrators irt maintaining 
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. . . . [T]he preservation 
of order and a proper educational environment requires close supervision 
of schoolchildren, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that 
would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult. 46 
This regime would permit schools' flexibility in their disciplinary 
procedures while likewise preserving the informality of the relationships 
between students and teachers. 47 Requiring schools to get warrants 
before they search students is unsuitable to an environment where 
discipline must be swift and informaL Likewise, this environment is 
unsuitable to requiring teachers to familiarize themselves with the 
niceties of probable cause. Therefore, all a school official must show is 
that the search was reasonable at its inception a reasonable suspicion 
that a student is violating either the law or a school rule and reasonable 
in its scope.48 With this effort, the Court seemed to abandon in loco 
parentis for a more modem treatment of the student-school relationship 
whereby a school's disciplinary actions are guided by norms set out in 
school rules and the law, definitive benchmarks as well as hallmarks of 
modem public education. 49 
44. /d. at 338-40. 
45. !d. at 337 
46. /d. at 339. 
47. /d. at 340. 
48. /d.at341-42. 
49. For the proposition that the Court killed in loco parentis once and for all in New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., see Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 269-70, and Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 278. 
On the other hand, Justice Powell had a tough time giving up in loco parentis and concurred in New 
Jersey v. TL.O. on notions of in loco parentis "lite": 
The special relationship between teacher and student also distinguishes the setting within 
which schoolchildren operate. Law enforcement officers function as adversaries of 
criminal suspects. These officers have the responsibility to investigate criminal activity; 
to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and to facilitate the charging and bringing 
of such persons to trial. Rarely does this type of adversarial relationship exist between 
school authorities and pupils. Instead, there is a commonality of interests between 
teachers and their pupils. The attitude of the typical teacher is one of personal 
responsibility for the student's welfare as well as for his education. 
The primary duty .of school officials and teachers, as the Court states, is the education 
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Inexplicably,_ ten years later, the Court reverted to the familiar in loco 
parentis. 
The need to justify random urinalysis testing of high school athletes 
impelled the Supreme Court to once again visit the balancing of Fourth 
Amendment rights with the government interests in Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton.50 But unlike the New Jersey v. T.L.O. Court, the 
Vernonia Court relied heavily on in loco parentis in ultimately 
determining that the school district's Student Athlete Drug Policy was 
constitutional: "[W]hen the government acts as guardian and tutor the 
relevant question is whether the search is one that a reasonable guardian 
and tutor might undertake. Given the findings of need made by the 
District Court, we conclude that in the present case it is.''51 The Court 
abandoned the fairly rational balancing test of New Jersey v. T.L.O. and 
instead applied the in loco parentis doctrine to diminish students'' Fourth 
Amendment expectations of privacy. Rather than justify the drug-
testing scheme within a legitimate govennnental interest in maintaining 
order and discipline in schools, the Court created a different 
govermnental interest victims that the school district must protect: "( 1) 
children, who (2) have been committed to the temporary custody ofthe 
State as schoolmaster."52 
In supporting this rationale, the Court acknowledged that in lo_co 
parentis may no longer be a shield from constitutional inquiry, 
particularly in light of compulsory attendance laws. Nevertheless, the 
Court needed a reason to protect the victims it had created and found it 
in the "custodial and tutelary" power of schools, thereby "pertnitting a 
degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free 
adults."53 Having reduced students' Fourth Amendment expectations of 
privacy because of the victims created by the in loco parentis doctrine, 
the Court still felt compelled to justify this new "duty'' to protect and 
returned to in loco parentis to describe the government's need as 
and training of young people. A State has a compelling interest in assuring_ that the-
schools meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining 
order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students. And apart from education, the 
school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also 
to protect teachers themselves from violence-by the few students whose conduct in recent 
years has prompted national concern. For me, it would be unreasonable and at odds with 
history to argue that the full panoply of constitutional rules applies with the same force 
and effect in the schoolhouse as it does in the enforcement of criminal laws. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349-50 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
50. 515 u.s. 646 (1995). 
51. !d. at 665. 
52. /d. at 664. 
53. /d. at 655. The Court, however, took great pains to note that in loco parentis discipline and 
control of students did not translate into the -commensurate in loco parentis duty to protect. ld. 
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"important enough" to justify random urinalyses. 54 Both these 
arguments one for control and discipline and the other for care and 
protection are classic ingredients of in loco parentis, even if the Court 
. . 
did not specifically mention either Blackstone or the Latinism. But the 
Court's authoritarian tendencies remain focused on the school districts' 
right to discipline and not on the concomitant duty to protect, except in 
rationalizing the expansion of school district discretion to control and 
discipline. 55 
The Court -used nearly the same reasoning later to justify 
suspicionless yet mandatory g testing of all middle and high 
school students who wished to participate in extracurricular activities in 
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of 
Pottawatomie County v. Earls. 56 In that case, the Court ratified the 
school district's policy without requiring any particularized or 
identifiable drug problem within this particular population to justify 
regular drug-testing because there was (and remains) a "nationwide 
54. ''[T]he Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under a 
public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care." I d. In further support for 
reintroducing in loco parentis into the analysis of restricting Fourth Amendment rights, the Court went 
to great pains. to gather evidence of the need for control and discipline. necessary to maintaining the 
school's educational mission: "And of course the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just 
upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty, as the educational process is disrupted." ld. 
at 662. Indeed, the Court noted the school district's very real concerns: 
We are not inclined to question indeed, we could not possibly find clearly erroneous.-
the District Court's conclusion that "a large segment of the. student body, particularly 
those involved in interscholastic athJ~tics, was in a state of rebellion/' that "[ d]isciplinary 
actions had reached 'epidemic proportions,'" and that "the rebel1ion was being fueled by 
alcohol and drug abuse as well as by the student's misperceptions about the drug 
culture." 
/d. at 662--63 (alteration in original). The Court also made equally plausible arguments based on the 
physical and psychological effects that drugs have on children, including the substantial physical risks 
run by drug-using student~athletes while playing sports. But overarching aH concerns are those for the 
"victims" not the individual student and the student's Fourth Amendment rights: ~'[T]he necessity for the 
State to act is magnified by the fact -that this evil is being visited not just upon individuals at large, but 
upon children for whom it has undertaken a special responsibility ofcate and direction." ld. at 662. 
55. Curious then is the Court's continued commitment to excluding any duty to protect from the 
school district's roster of educational responsibilities, particularly any constitutional duty to protect 
children as held in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655. Thus, the Court's commitment to in loco parentis remained on the discipline 
and control end of the parental duty and elevating it to such constitutional imperative, of such high 
governmental importance, as to limit students' Fourth Amendment expectations of privacy but without 
any enforceable duty to protect. Thus, that "duty" as posited in Vernonia is ephemeral and merely a 
rhetorical bludgeon to justify expanding a school district;s disciplinary power but not its protective 
duties. 
56. 536 U.S. 822 (2002). In Earls, the school district's policy applied to any student who wanted 
to participate in extracurricular activities, such as FF A, band,. choir, National Honor Society, and the 
1ike. 
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epidemic of drug use."57 According to the Court, this generalized 
evidence was sufficient government interest for a school district to 
protect children in its care from that drug-use epidemic. In doing so, the 
Court also necessarily diminished those children's constitutional rights 
because of the unchallengeable assertion that a "student's privacy 
interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is 
responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety"58 and "to 
prevent and deter the substantial hartn of childhood drug use."59 By 
these pronouncements, the Court abandoned any objective standard of 
detertnining whether student searches have anything to do with the 
violation of school rules. Furthermore, the institutional mission to 
maintain order and control is subservient to the nearly limitless 
discretion afforded to the school's "protective" function. Although in 
loco parentis power of schools historically derived from their 
disciplinary function, the Court in Earls appealed to the converse the 
protective side of a parent's role for which there is little historical 
support, legal tradition, or case precedent and certainly no nortns. 
What little legal precedent exists for this strange turn in the fortunes 
of the in loco parentis doctrine was fed in large measure by a First 
Amendment case. In fashioning this protective rationale in student 
search cases, the Court relied heavily on the in loco parentis doctrine set 
out in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser. 6° Fraser involved a 
school district's defense against a § 1983 suit brought by a student who 
had been disciplined for making a sexually suggestive campaign speech 
during a student assembly. In upholding the school district's 
disciplinary action, the Court emphasized that schools acting in loco 
parentis must protect children from being exposed to indecent, lewd, or 
sexually explicit speech61 because schools' educational mission is to 
"inculcat[ e] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a 
democratic political system. " 62 According to the Court, this role is an 
important government interest to be balanced against students' First 
57. /d. at 836. The school did put on evidence that there was illegal "drug use" in the school 
district but none that would target this particular student population. /d. at 834-35. Consequently, there 
could be no particularized suspicion of any individual's being a drug user or rule violator, as required in 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
58. !d. at 830. 
59. /d. at 836. 
60. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). Justice Scalia specifically quoted Fraser's in loco parentis passage-
taking some liberties with its actual usage as part of the Court's rationale in upholding the random 
drug-testing in Vernonia. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 655. 
61. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684. 
62. /d. at 681, 683. 
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Amendment rights. 63 This role gives a school district the sole discretion 
to determine what speech is appropriate to the school: 
[S]chools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social 
order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers and indeed the older 
students demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and 
political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of class. 
Inescapably, like parents, they are role models. The schools, as 
instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, 
mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, 
indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this 
confused boy. 64 
With little more government interest than this, the Court determined 
that the school had the better part of the balance against the First 
Amendment. This precedent, which touts the schools' parental and 
tutelary responsibilities, proved useful for balancing against students' 
Fourth Amendment rights in the student search cases and demonstrates 
how in loco parentis came to be resurrected. 
Unfortunately, in loco parentis fails as a rational support for giving 
school boards the nearly unlimited discretion that courts persist in 
according them. It is chiefly a doctrine devised by the law that has little 
application to how education professionals actually do or should run 
their schools. The key to eliminating it, therefore, is to demonstrate how 
the legal interpretation of the doctrine is wrong, or at least has been 
misapplied in public education law. 
Ill. IN LOCO PARENTIS "WOULD BE ENORMOUSLY IMPROVED BY DEA TH"65 
As a preliminary matter, any knowledge that teachers and school 
administrators have about in loco parentis likely has more to do with 
their experiences as undergraduate students than from information 
intentionally conveyed to them during a teacher training program. 
Indeed, there is little literature that instructs teachers how to act in loco 
parentis. An infortnal Internet search revealed primarily materials 
63. "The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and 
classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior." /d. at 681. 
64. /d. at 683. The Court made particular note that U.S. Senators have been censured for abusive 
language on the floor and likened schools to the Senate: why should students have more freedoms than 
U.S. Senators? !d. at 682. Since then, of course, we have had a Vice President utter an obscenity-
"F@*# you!" on the floor of the chamber to a sitting Senator without repercussion. Helen Dewar & 
Dana Milbank, Cheney Dismisses Critic with Obscenity, WASH. POST, June 25, 2004, at A4. 
65. H.H. MUNRO ("Saki"), The Feast of Nemesis, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF SAKI 322 
(Doubleday & Co. 1976). 
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relating to legal decisions. A cursory glance through contemporary 
books on education history and strategies yielded a similar conclusion. 
The only references to in loco parentis are limited to matters of 
historical significance or legal opinions. 66 Some contemporary 
educational texts do not even list the Latinism in their indices. 67 
For all the folderol that goes on in courts concerning in loco parentis, 
one would think that professional educators would be versed in this 
doctrine. That, however, is not the case. Indeed, a fairly recent, albeit 
small, survey of teachers indicated that many did not know what in loco 
parentis means; the majority of respondents stated that they had no right 
to react to students as a parent would. 68 A more comprehensive survey 
is likely unnecessary to conclude that educators do not rely on the in 
loco parentis doctrine because it is meaningless to them. Perhaps the 
lack of familiarity exists because the phrase has a meaning pertinent 
only to the law and not useful to professional educators. 69 As a term of 
art, it provides teachers no guidance in classroom management, and 
professional educators would not touch the doctrine with a ten-foot 
barge pole because it is descriptive, not normative. It is a legalism not 
modem reality. 
In loco parentis lingers because it takes the burden off courts from 
questioning the discretion of school board decisions. Ironically, the 
doctrine only reached that evolutionary stage by misinterpreting 
Blackstone's use of the Latinism, by limiting it to school discipline 
without regard to the obligations imposed by standing "in the place of a 
parent." 
66. See, e.g., RODGER W. BYBEE & E. GORDON GEE, VIOLENCE, VALUES, AND JUSTICE IN THE 
SCHOOLS (1982) (history); JOAN C. HARLAN & SIDNEY T. ROWLAND, BEHAVIOR MANAGEMENT 
STRATEGIES FOR TEACHERS: ACHIEVING INSTRUCTIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, STUDENT SUCCESS, AND 
STUDENT MOTIVATION EVERY TEACHER AND ANY STUDENT CAN! (Charles C. Thomas, 2d ed. 2002) 
(legal). 
67. See, e.g., RALPH M. GERSTEIN & LOIS A. GERSTEIN, EDUCATION LAW: AN ESSENTIAL 
GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS, TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, PARENTS AND STUDENTS (2d ed. 2007); THE 
SAGE HANDBOOK OF EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP: ADVANCES IN THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 
(Fenwick W. English ed., 2005); R. MURRAY THOMAS, WHAT SCHOOLS BAN AND WHY (2008); WAYNE 
J. URBAN & JENNINGS L. WAGONER, JR., AMERICAN EDUCATION: A HISTORY (Routledge 4th ed. 2009). 
68. Anthony E. Conte, In Loco Parentis: Alive and Well, 121 Enuc. 195, 196-97 (2000). The 
survey seems a bit misdirected. The thesis is good: how to improve educator-parent colJaborations. But 
couching that thesis based on whether teachers are or are not familiar with the legal parameters of in 
loco parentis seems a bit tangential, particularly when the author of the survey noted that only about 
18.3% of respondents had discussed the doctrine in their teacher preparation programs. /d. at 198-99. 
One of the conclusions that perhaps would have been more valid is that, if in loco parentis is not being 
taught in teacher preparation courses, there might be a good reason not to. 
69. This legalistic usage of the Latinism may be similar to that attributable to "insanity" and its 
distinctive use by the legal profession but not by the medical profession. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, 
Empathy and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009, http://fish.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/24/empathy-
and-the-law/?ref=opinion. 
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A. What Blackstone Really Meant 
It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in 
phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis. 
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 70 
Perhaps the starting point in unraveling the erroneous interpretation of 
Blackstone's in loco parentis doctrine and tracing it to its current revival 
is to discern what parental rights and responsibilities might inform in 
loco parentis, even as a descriptive as opposed to normative standard. 
Until recently, parents' rights over their children were almost limitless in 
the United States, and individual states were loath to interfere in the 
parent-child relationship. 71 The legal authority of a parent over a child 
was virtually unquestioned because that authority was "understood to be 
grounded in natural law and ... not dependent on behavior that 
promoted the child's interest."72 Even today, legal treatment of the 
parent-child relationship remains mired in ancient tradition and "accords 
unwarranted legal protection to biological parents in ways that are both 
directly harmful and symbolically corrosive to the interests of their 
children."73 Although it seems unlikely that parents would entrust their 
children to another so they could be used and abused in ways that are 
unquestioned by the law, this reluctance to interfere in the parent-child 
relationship could naturally be construed as inuring to one who is in loco 
parentis. So the historical perspective points to the seeds of a school 
official's nearly unlimited discretion. 
At the same time, the law has been slow to recognize parents' duties 
toward their children, the responsibility to protect and care for them. 
Depending upon the jurisdiction, criminal statutes have recognized a 
parental duty to protect by imposing sanctions for child neglect and 
child abuse.74 Under tort law, an affirmative duty of a parent to protect 
70. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347,391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
71. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401, 2407 
(1995). 
72. /d. at 2407. 
73. /d. at 2406. One specific aspect that the courts and legislatures both have been loath to 
address is parental use of corporal punishment. Even in criminal cases, parents may have a "parental 
corporal punishment privilege" as a justification defense to criminal charges for using force against their 
children. "[T]he greatest problem emanating from the parental privilege to use disciplinary force is that 
in an attempt to accommodate traditional disciplinary practices, current standards hedge on the issue of 
whether parents can physically injure their child." Johnson, supra note 29, at 418. 
74. Vincent R. Johnson & Claire G. Hargrove, The Tort Duty of Parents to Protect Minor 
Children, 51 YILL. L. REv. 311, 312-13 (2006). 
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a child has been slow to evolve. As the American Law Institute prepares 
to launch its new Restatement (Third) of Torts, it has noted that "there 
has been almost no judicial consideration of the affirmative duties of 
family members to each other."75 Consequently, we also have the seeds 
for a general reluctance to impose any duties on schools for the safety of 
the children in their charge. 76 
So did Blackstone really mean, when he described the common law 
responsibilities of the teacher as in loco parentis, that teachers would 
have nearly unbridled discretion in the charge of children? His language 
suggests he did: 
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his 
life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, 
75. /d. at 316. The American Law Institute further stated that "a number of ... courts do not 
view the parent's duty to the child as an affirmative one." RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY 
FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 40, cmt. o, Reporter's Notes (Proposed Final Draft No. I, April 6, 2005). 
Ironically, the Restatement (Third) of Torts does acknowledge that there might be an affinnative duty 
between a parent and minor child under a custodial duty, but not necessarily as a special parent-child 
relationship. /d. at cmt. n. The custodial duty would generally recognize an affinnative duty of a 
custodian to one in custody, such as children in day-care, prisoners, hospital patients, children in 
summer camp, and the like. /d. at cmt. n, Reporter's Notes. 
This attitude may go a long way toward explaining the near dearth of parental duties to 
children mentioned in leading literature that espouses parental rights in the education of their children. 
See, e.g., Tara Dahl, Surveys in America's Classrooms: How Much Do Parents Really Know?, 37 J. L. & 
Eouc. 143, 148-49 (2008) (author posits a general parental duty to provide education without any 
enforceable rights in children or from the state); Linda L. Schlueter, Parental Rights in the Twenty-First 
Century: Parents as Full Partners in Education, 32 ST. MARY'S L.J. 611 (2001); see also Eric A. 
Degroff, Parental Rights and Public School Curricula: Revisiting Mozer! after 20 Years, 38 J.L. & 
Eouc. 83, 108-12 (2009). Degroff makes a persuasive case that legal scholars imposed a duty upon 
parents to provide children with an education, particularly from English philosophers and scholars. But 
he makes no persuasive case that parents have ever been held accountable for that duty. Indeed, he 
concedes that point when he states that parents will be held accountable for breach of that duty only if 
there is a "clear omission." /d. at 112. He merely uses the duty as a neat segue to his primary thesis that 
parents' rights to control education are fundamental. !d. at II 0--11. Implicitly, his posture seems to 
il1ustrate the concern that Justice Douglas expressed in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) 
(Douglas, J. dissenting in part): 
Our opinions are full of talk about the power of the parents over the child's education ... 
. And we have in the past analyzed similar conflicts between parent and State with little 
regard for the views of the child.. . . Recent cases, however, have dearly held that the 
children themselves have constitutionally protectible interests. 
Furthennore, a duty to provide an education is easily confused with the parental right to direct a child's 
upbringing. See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
76. As it turns out, of course, courts are also reluctant to impose a duty to protect on schools. At 
most, they will impose a duty to supervise, but because of the exigencies of the nature and of the number 
of children under their care, school districts generally do not have a duty to protect. They clearly have 
no constitutional duty to protect if courts follow DeShaney in the school context. The Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, however, recognizes a special student-school relationship that may alter that notion a 
bit. RESTATEMENT (TH1RD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM§ 40 (Proposed Final Draft No. 
I, April 6, 2005). 
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and has such a portion of the power of the parent committed to his charge, 
viz. that of restraint and correction, as may be necessary to answer the 
purposes for which he is employed. 77 
Parsing the meaning of any common law doctrine is often difficult. 
Unlike statutes in which legislators presumably have chosen precise 
words that courts can interpret the connnon law is usually gleaned 
from the ideas that the words are intended to convey. What is clear is 
that Blackstone was not any more specific about what he meant by in 
loco parentis than what we know about parental rights. If we examine 
the text no further, we find no outermost limits to the relationship of the 
teacher to the child than we do about the relationship of the parent to the 
child, at least from this minimal fraction of Blackstone's work that has 
been quoted time and again as the foundation for court decisions about 
student-school relationships. 
Two options remain: we can examine the context of Blackstone's in 
loco parentis provision, and we can examine how courts have 
interpreted that provision. In examining both, we find that in loco 
parentis is out-dated (if it was ever proper) and is useless in guiding 
either courts or schools. 
First, the context of Blackstone's statement is both textual where in 
his Commentaries it arises and temporal when it was written. 
Textually, Blackstone's in loco parentis pronouncement appears in 
Book I, The Rights of Persons, in Chapter Sixteen, ''Of Parent and 
Child." In that chapter, Blackstone related the civil law principle that a 
man who has children has the duty to provide maintenance if they 
cannot otherwise provide for themselves. 78 Their protection, while not 
required, is pertnitted by law. 79 Blackstone also posited that parents 
have a duty to educate their children suitably to their station in life but 
acknowledged that the law of England articulated that duty in only two 
instances: apprenticeship education of the poor and penalties on parents 
who sent their children out of England for a Roman Catholic 
education. 80 Otherwise, only natural law suggested that parents educate 
their children or face the consequences of being saddled with 
uneducated issue. 81 
Concurrent with these parental duties, Blackstone described the legal 
foundation for parental powers: "The power of parents over their 
77. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *441. 
78. BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *436-37. 
79. I d. at *438. 
80. I d. at *439. 
81. /d. Consequently, "[t)he rich indeed are left at their own option, whether they will breed up 
their children to be ornaments or disgraces to their family." ld. 
• 
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children is derived from the fortner consideration, their duty; this 
authority being given them, partly to enable the parent more effectually 
to perform his duty, and partly as a recompence for his care and trouble 
in the faithful discharge of it."82 Although an ancient Roman father had 
the power of life and death over his children, a contemporary English 
father had power "much more moderate; but still sufficient to keep the 
child in order and obedience. He may lawfully correct his child, being 
under age, in a reasonable manner; for this is for the benefit of his 
education."83 Although Blackstone placed his provision for in loco 
parentis within this description of parental power,84 the overall context 
places Blackstone's reference to in loco parentis as equally referring to 
both duties and powers of parents to be placed in the hands of the "tutor 
or schoolmaster" as it can to being limited to just a delegation of 
disciplinary power. The conjunction "and" and the limiting phrase "as 
may be necessary to answer the purposes for whic·h he is employed" 
' ' ' 
suggest that the last phrase of Blackstone's charg.e merely limits the 
disciplinary power of the schoolmaster or tutor without otherwise 
diminishing the parental duties of support and protection that he the 
schoolmaster or tutor must likewise undertake~ 
The latter and broader interpretation makes more sense in the 
temporal context than the narrow limits courts have attributed to the 
doctrine as applying to disciplinary power only. This interpretation is 
also congruent with the contemporary treatment of apprenticeships. The 
apprenticeship programs were a transfer of parental custody of a child to 
a master, who stood in loco parentis to the child and "provid[ed] 
education and support in return for the minor's Iabor."85 Thus, the in 
loco parentis doctrine for apprenticeship educational programs was not 
confined to the master's capacity to discipline the apprentice. Masters 
also had an enforceable duty to provide education and support to their 
apprentices. Indeed, one U.S. court ruled that an ''[a]pprenticeship 
would remain a binding indenture that required education and support in 
return for labor"86 because the master's "responsibilities existed 
independently from [the apprentice's] ability to work for him."87 Thus, 
82. /d. at *440. 
83. Id. (footnote omitted) 
84. The doctrine is hard on the heels of Blackstone's assertion that the "power'' of the parent 
extends even beyond death so that he may, by his wiH, appoint a guardian for his children. /d. at *44). 
85. James D. Schmidt, ''Restless Movements Characteristic of Childhood": The Legal 
Construction of Child Labor in Nineteenth-Century Massachusetts, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 315, 320 
(2005). As Blackstone pointed out, apprenticeships were generally used by the poor for educational 
purposes. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
86. Schmidt, supra note 85, at 321. 
87. /d. at 322. 
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in the temporal context of Blackstone's authorship, the common 
understanding of in loco parentis even in the United States- extended 
beyond parental discipline. 
Blackstone's application of in loco parentis to schoolmasters and 
tutors likely would not have been much different than that commonly 
given in apprenticeship programs. He wrote the -Commentaries in the 
mid-eighteenth century when English schools were not creatures of the 
state. 88 When the rich exercised their Hnatural'' duty to educate, they 
voluntarily exercised that right, rather than being mandated by the state. 
Their educational options were also not state-run; Parliament considered 
education voluntary. 89 Around that time, England provided education in 
a variety of organizational forms, 90 the most common of which included 
home instruction; Dame Schools; Latin Grammar schools; "public" 
schools; and universities.91 None of these; options were large 
institutions except perhaps the universities and, in many respects, 
relied upon either in-house or residential instruction. 92 
Blackstone was not an ardent supporter of state-run education.93 
Although he was considered instrumental in the movement of reform-
minded, eighteenth-century England, the underlying "philosophy was 
predo-minantly individualistic and utilitarian."94 Hence, two of his sons 
attended Cheam, a private classical95 boarding school ''where the Master 
88. FREDERICK EBY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN EDUCATION: IN THEORY, ORGANIZATION, 
AND PRACTICE 266 (2d ed. 1952); NICHOLAS HANS, NEW TRENDS IN EDUCATION IN THE EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY 15 (1951). 
89. EBY, supra note 88, at 266. 
90. HANS, supra note 88, at I 7-24. 
91. Home instruction consisted of private tutors for older children and nurses for younger 
children. Dame Schools were "a combination nursery and primary school conducted by a mistress who 
divided her time between teaching and domestic tasks." EBY, supra note 88, at 267. The "dames" 
running the schools often could barely read and write, and their primary educational goals were to teach 
religious passages, the alphabet, and easy words for reading. The Latin grammar schools, although 
becoming obsolete, focused on a classical education based on learning Latin. /d. at 90, 268. By the 
eighteenth century, only the rich could afford the nurses and tutors necessary for children to succeed at 
the Latin grammar schools. The ''great public schools" established in England w,ere boarding schools, 
often affiliated with a college. Although at first formed for the education of pour boys, they eventually 
became the bastions of the aristocracy. !d. at 38; HANS, supra note 88, at 17-19. And, of course, higher 
education was offered by Oxford and Cambridge, which at that time "did not look upon the 
advancement ofknowledge as one of their functions." EBY, supra note 88, at 268; 
92. Similarly, private school options were the only educational opportunities in colonial North 
America. See, e.g., BYBEE & GEE, supra note 66, at 24-25. 
93. EBY, supra note 88, at 372. 
94. /d. Although the eighteenth centUry saw England in a period of transition with regard to 
refortning education, those reforms were slow to gain traction~ particularly because of the English 
character of the time: "While politically democratic, they were economically individualistic and socially 
worshipers of aristocracy.'' /d. at 370. 
95. HANS, supra note 88, at 117, 123. These boarding schools grew up in opposition to the 
classical Latin grammar schools and their teaching methods. "Most teachers [in Latin schools] had 
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himself boarded the boys and was more of a 'paterfamilias' than the 
distant demi-god of a large public institution."96 Blackstone's in loco 
parentis charge therefore must be understood to mean that a parent may 
transfer authority over the child to a tutor (typically employed in the 
household) or schoolmaster (of a boarding school). And in this temporal 
context, Blackstone likely meant that when a parent contracted for these 
residential arrangements for a tutor or schoolmaster, parents were 
conveying both welfare and tutelary responsibilities, not just disciplinary 
duties. Indeed, English education law did not confine the in loco 
parentis doctrine to disciplinary authority but interpreted this parental 
delegation also to require that the schoolmaster act as a "reasonably 
prudent and careful parent."97 In fact, under English law, Blackstone's 
in loco parentis imposed duties on the teacher that might exceed those of 
the parent.98 But this is not how U.S. courts have interpreted or used in 
loco parentis. 
B. How U.S. Courts Got It Wrong 
[We] have really everything in common with America nowadays, except, 
of course, language. 
-Oscar Wilde99 
Although giving frequent lip-service to Blackstone's in loco parentis 
doctrine, U.S. courts never adopted the accurate cormnon law tradition 
in public education though they did for higher education. 10° First, 
neither method nor sound learning themselves, but they knew how to beat the child without mercy." 
EBY, supra note 88, at 126. 
96. HANS, supra note 88, at 11 7. 
97. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 263; see Starr v. Crone; (1950) 4 D.L.R. 433, citing to 
Williams v. Eady, (1893) 10 T.L.R. 41, for the standard. See also Myers v. Peel (County Bd. of Educ.), 
(1981) 123 D.L.R. (3d) l. Courts in New York have used the standard of "a parent of ordinary 
prudence" but in the context of defining a teacher's duty of supervision. E.g .. Lawes v. Bd. of Educ., 
213 N.E.2d 667,668 (N.Y. 1965); Ohman v. Bd. ofEduc., 90 N.E.2d 474,475 (N.Y. 1949). As further 
discussed, infra, the duty of supervision in U.S. public education law does not rise to a level of duty to 
protect and is conceptually separate from in loco parentis. 
98. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 264; see generally Jean LeDrew Metcalfe, "[T} here 
could not be a better definition": A Defence of the Careful or Prudent Parent Standard, 13 Enuc. & L.J . 
257 (2003). 
99. OSCAR WILDE, The Cantervi/le Ghost, in LORD ARTHUR SAVILE'S CRIME AND OTHER 
STORIES 89, 94 (1891 ). 
100. In loco parentis in higher education recognized the college's duty to protect student welfare. 
See W. Burlette Carter, Responding to the Perversion of In Loco Parentis: Using a Nonprofit 
Organization to Support Student-Athletes, 35 IND. L. REv. 851, 856-58 (2002); Theodore C. 
Stamatokos, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability and the Student-College Relationship, 65 
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U.S. public education law cases misinterpreted in loco parentis to mean 
a transfer of only the parent's disciplinary authority without the 
concomitant welfare duty, unlike the English cases. In the alternative, 
even if not misinterpreted, in loco parentis is not the appropriate 
standard to use in a state-run public institution governed by compulsory 
education laws. As a consequence of either problem, the doctrine's 
resurrection from its late-twentieth-century doldrums was based on 
outdated, outmoded, and unworkable reasoning. 
First, courts in the United States never really adopted in loco parentis 
as a usable doctrine of behavior for professional educators but merely as 
a convenient legal Latinism for something distinct from Blackstone's 
meaning. Courts used the doctrine almost exclusively to justify school 
discipline. As noted above, in loco parentis was the foundation for 
cases examining corporal punishment and student searches in the United 
States. 101 In fortnulating that foundation, courts latched onto 
Blackstone's reference to "restraint and correction" as the underlying 
delegation of a single power. 102 Perhaps for those colonial schools in 
the same temporal context as Blackstone's, adopting in loco parentis 
might have made sense as the only available resource for legal authority. 
But then courts did not also invoke the doctrine to hold public schools 
accountable for the welfare of students. 
Unlike English courts, U.S. courts have not recognized a reasonable 
parental duty that teachers have over the welfare of their students. A 
very few cases and a smaller number of jurisdictions have 
recognized some fonn of duty to students that ostensibly arises from in 
loco parentis. 103 That duty, however, was not based on the welfare of 
the child but rather on the teacher's obligation to provide education and 
training. 104 Courts were not willing to let teachers completely off the 
hook for their responsibilities to students under the law, as parents might 
be, but they were loath to impose a high level of responsibility on 
IND. L.J. 4 71, 4 73 ( 1990); see also Gavin Henning, Is In Consortia Cum Parenti bus the New In Loco 
Parentis?, 44 NASPA J. 538, 539-40 (2007). The progenitor case, Gott v. Berea College, 161 S.W. 204 
(Ky. 1913), "suggests that the in loco parentis doctrine imposes a duty to protect the physical welfare of 
students." Stamatokos, supra, at 474. It has been suggested that the adoption of this familial model of 
higher education, based on in loco parentis, was a result of U.S. institutions' efforts to imitate the 
educational organizations of Oxford and Cambridge. Jackson, supra note 20, at 1135-36. In loco 
parentis at the higher education level exhibited four different types of power wielded by colleges and 
universities: the power to direct student behavior; the power to punish; the responsibility of care; and 
partial immunity from limits on student searches. HOEKEMA, supra note 36, at 27-28. 
101. Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 273; Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 262-63, 265-
68. 
102. DeMitchell, supra note 20, at 19. 
103. See generally Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 279- 81. 
104. ld. at 280. 
992 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
teachers. 105 As a consequence, most jurisdictions that have weighed in 
on the issue typically hold that a teacher only has a duty of supervision, 
not a duty to the child's welfare. 106 In fact, the current trend seems to be 
moving away from ensuring that students learn in a safe environment to 
imposing liability only if the teacher's ·behavior constitutes wanton or 
willful misconduct.107 Thus, U.S. courts did not properly adopt the in 
loco parentis doctrine as likely envisioned by Blackstone to include both 
the welfare and disciplinary powers of the parent. 108 
In the alternative, even if U.S. courts had fully embraced in loco 
parentis, it is now obsolete. Current compulsory education laws require 
parental delegation of their educational responsibility. 109 The Supreme 
Court even cited this involuntary delegation as a rationale for moving 
away from in loco parentis as the justification for corporal punishment: 
Although the early cases viewed the authority of the teacher as deriving 
from the parents, the concept ofparental delegation has been replaced by 
the view more consonant with compulsory education laws that the State 
itself may impose such corporal punishment as is reasonably necessary 
''for the pro~er education of the child and for the maintenance of group 
discipline.'' 1 0 
l 05. /d. at 280. 
106. "All teachers and administrators are expected to provide reasonable supervision of students 
under their charge." NATHAN L. ESSEX, SCHOOL LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 
FOR EDUCATIONAL LEADERS 113 ( 1999). This duty of supervision presumably arose out of in loco 
parentis. /d. at 116. But schoo]s are not insurers of student safety. Teachers only need act as a prudent 
person would under the circumstances. GERSTEIN & GERSTEIN, supra note 67, at 228. One- author 
suggests that in loco parentis as adopted by U.S. courts embraces the duty to protect. DeMitchell, supra 
note 20, at 23-26; see also Peter Gallagher, Note, The Kids Aren't Alright: Why Courts Should Impose a 
Constitutional Duty on Schools to Protect Students, 8 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 377 (2001). 
That author, however, relied on the Supreme Court rationales in its controversial student search cases. 
Those rationales are primarily nonstarters in any lega1 sense because no other court irt the country has 
recognized the duty to protect students, and the Court itself refuses to recognize any constitutional duty 
to protect. 
1 07. See Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research 
and Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort Duties to Supervise, 17 TEMP. L. REv. 641, 688 (2004). 
108. A coup]e of mid-twentieth-century U.S. cases seem to posit the reasonable, prudent parent 
standard to protect children. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 263-64. Closer examination of those 
cases, however; reveals a closer kinship to the duty to supervise than a duty to protect. See Ohr,nan v. 
Bd. ofEduc. of City of New York, 90 N.E.2d 474,475 (N.Y. 1949); Hoose v. Drumm, 22 N.E.2d 233, 
234 (N.Y. 1939). 
109. See generally Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 26K 
110. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (footnote omitted). Another court expressed it 
this way: 
[l]n a compulsory education system, the parent does not voluntarily yield his authority 
over the child to the school, so the concept of delegated authority is of little use. We 
agree with most courts that school officials have special duties with associated powers, 
but we prefer not to tie them to the in loco parentis doctrine. Instead we view the school 
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In fact, the Court's New Jersey v. T.L.O. student search opinion 
seemed to have put the doctrine to bed in 1985: "Today's public school 
officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily conferred on them 
by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of publicly 
mandated education and disciplinary policies." 111 
New Jersey v. T.L. 0. was a perfect opportunity to kill in loco parentis 
in its tracks. What does this doctrine interpreted to deal with 
disciplinary measures have to do with a student search? Searches are 
not disciplinary measures like corporal punishment although punishment 
may arise from the fruits of the search. Instead, searches are a police 
function perhaps a uniquely institutional function designed to create 
a safe educational environment, not a parental function delegated to the 
school. Regardless, the Supreme Court has staked its claim to revive in 
loco parentis to student searches. 
On the heels of New Jersey v. T.L.O. and during the mid-1980s, some 
authorities suggested that the in loco parentis doctrine was dead or at 
least so weakened that it soon would be. 112 But these authorities had not 
counted on the Supreme Court's desire to take part in the War on Drugs. 
The revival of the doctrine, as recounted above in Vernonia and Earls, is 
not without logic. The Court seems to view its role as that of a parent, 
or in any event, views hierarchical managers especially governmental 
managers . as having superior abilities by the mere virtue of being 
managers. Their decisions are unquestionably correct. 113 This 
reverence for school officials is doubly enticing because of the historical 
reliance on in loco parentis as the source of school authority. Never 
mind that modem educational managers have moved to more 
professional standards; it has become a doctrine of convenience to 
justify the Court's allowing school officials to wield discretion with 
little oversight. 
Even the Court's recent rationale is not in keeping with the in loco 
parentis doctrine. If one relies on Blackstone's version of the 
as a special situation, in the same way that the border or an airport presents a special 
situation 0 0 . 0 
Horton vo Goose Creek Indepo Scho Dist., 690 Fo2d 470, 481 no18 (5th Ciro 1982) (citations omitted); 
Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 268. 
Ill. New Jersey v. T.LOO., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985); see Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 
269-700 
112. Hogan & Schwartz, supra note 20, at 269-70; Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 282. And 
it is pretty much dead at the higher education level where, in fact, the doctrine made a great deal more 
sense. E.g., Henning, supra note 100, at 541; Stamatakos, supra note 100, at 474-76. But see Randall 
Bowden, Evolution of Responsibility: From In Loco Parentis to Ad Meliora Vertamur, 127 Eouc. 480 
(2007). 
113. See, e.g., Garcetti v. CebaiJos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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doctrine which the Court did in the recent cases then the delegation 
of the power should be confined to· a particular child and a search of that 
child. As a result, the Court has reasoned that in loco parentis is the 
appropriate doctrine to protect other children. Unless there is a tutelary 
lesson given to the searched (or "disciplined") child, the school officials 
are searching on behalf of third parties. A parent's delegation of power 
would not,. logically, cover that analysis. Searching a student for the 
health and safety of the student body and the educational environment is 
an institutional goal, not a delegation of power from a parent. It may be 
a valid goal but is not sanctioned by the in loco parentis doctrine. 114 
The parental equivalent is a mother's searching the neighbor children 
before they can play with her children. The second logical problem is, 
of course, that parents are the ones who sue school districts for student 
search problems because they are not happy with the way schools are 
conducting themselves vis a vis their children: "In the absence of any 
other justification, the doctrine of in loco parentis has no applicability 
where, as here, the parents agree with the child rather than the 
school.'' 115 
In addition, the Court's rationale is not based on the U.S. version of in 
loco parentis, which does not acknowledge a duty to protect. Not only 
have all other U.S. courts to date shied away from imposing that duty 
under in loco parentis, most states' cotnmon law traditions impose on 
. . 
teachers nothing greater than a duty to supervise, which implies an 
institutional obligation, and n·ot a duty to protect, which implies a more 
personal, individualized obligation more akin to in loco parentis. 
But that did not stop the Court's most recent evocation of the in loco 
parentis doctrine, which exemplifies how far the Court is willing to rely 
on the doctrine, in Morse v. Frederick. 116 Although backing away from 
actually stipulating that in loco parentis was the basis for its decision, 
the Court piggy-backed all the reasoning of its recent drug se·arch cases 
to justify the discipline meted out by a school principal against a student 
who refused to comply with the principal's order to remove a banner at 
an off-campus, but school-sanctioned, event. The banner read "BONG 
HiTS. 4 JESUS" so the principal couched her action in a school district 
policy that forbade public student expression that advocated illegal drug 
114. But see BYBEE & GEE, supra note 66, at 64-65 ("[T]he doctrine of in loco 
parentis ... supports the notion that to maintain its effectiveness, education must be free of the 
enforcement of individual rights guaranteed to citizens in general.;'). 
115. Karr v. Schmidt, 320 F. Supp. 728, 734 n.19 (W.O. T~x. 1970) rev'd on other grounds, 460 
F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972); Breen v. Kabl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1 037~38 (7th Cir. 1969); Zirkel & Reichner, 
supra note 15, at 270. 
116. 551 u.s. 393 (2007). 
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use. 117 The case was postured in such a way that the Court could have 
relied on the disciplinary function of in loco parentis, but in doing so, 
the Court could not have created a blanket ban on drug-related speech, 
regardless of a school district's disciplinary rules. 
Setting aside whether the Court majority really thought the banner 
promoted illegal drug use, 118 the Court had to fumble its way to a 
resolution that would put the Court's imprimatur on this censorship. Of 
course, the Court majority's primary goal was to walk back the 
undeniably long-lasting impact of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District. 119 But in doing so in Morse, the Court 
could not decide whether the school district's role in limiting speech 
hung on its disciplinary power the principal was compelled to act 
because the banner was "in violation of established school policy"120-
or its protective duty "[ s ]tudent speech celebrating illegal drug use at a 
school event ... poses a particular challenge for school officials 
working to protect those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug 
abuse." 121 Although not explicitly endorsing in loco parentis,l22 the 
Court supplanted it with something equally amorphous: that the "special 
characteristics of the school environment" 123 empower school districts 
117. /d. at 397-98. 
118. What if the banner had said "DiNKY HOCKER SHOOTS SMACK"? This is no less 
nonsensical and attention-getting than the banner, but then the Court would run into the problem of 
censoring the title of a young adult novel that is touted as one of the most influential of the twentieth 
century. See M.E. KERR, DINKY HOCKER SHOOTS SMACK (HarperTeen 1989); One Hundred Books that 
Shaped the Century, SCH. LIBRARY J. (Jan. 1, 2000), 
http://www.schoollibraryjoumal.com/index.asp?layout=article&articleld=CA 153035&q=dinky+hocker 
+shoots+smack. 
119. 393 u.s. 503 (1969). 
120. Morse, 551 U.S. at 398. "In loco parentis has been used to justify school rules in general." 
Zirkel & Reichner, supra note 15, at 278. 
121. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408. "[S]chool boards know that peer pressure is perhaps 'the single 
most important factor leading schoolchildren to take drugs,' and that students are more likely to use 
drugs when the nonns in school appear to tolerate such behavior." /d. One author suggests that the 
Morse Court placed too great an emphasis on protection when the purpose of a democratic education is 
preparation. Andrea Kayne Kaufman, What Would Harry Potter Say about BONG HiTS 4 JESUS? 
Morse v. Frederick and the Democratic Implications of Using In Loco Parentis to Subordinate Tinker 
and Curtail Student Speech, 32 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 461,462 (2008). 
122. On the other hand, Justice Thomas's concurring opinion clearly supports a return to and 
strengthening of in loco parentis disciplinary powers in the schools. "In short, in the earliest public 
schools, teachers taught, and students listened. Teachers commanded, and students obeyed. Teachers 
did not rely solely on the power of ideas to persuade; they relied on discipline to maintain order." 
Morse, 551 U,S. at 412 (Thomas, J., concurring). As a consequence, Justice Thomas would defer 
completely to the decisions of schools and not protect student speech at all. /d. at 421. A recent 
analysis suggests that Thomas's dissent is historically inaccurate and merely "restorative nostalgia., 
David Blacker, An Unreasonable Argument Against Student Free Speech, 59 Eouc. THEORY 123, 137-
42 (2009). 
123. Morse, 551 U.S. at 408 (majority opinion). This "test" enunciated in Morse "special 
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"to detern1ine 'what manner of speech in the classroom or in school 
assembly is inappropriate.'" 124 Even if the Court implied in Morse that 
it abandoned its strange version of in loco parentis, all it did was put a 
different mask on it without providing any normative guidance to 
schools. Perhaps that was the point 
Given their reliance on this vague and merely descriptive principle, 
courts have given school officials carte blanche to treat students in a way 
that does not comport with good educational practice. As a 
consequence, school districts believe it completely appropriate to strip-
search a female middle-school student to find prescription strength 
ibuprofen with no evidence that the student might even have such pills, 
much less in her underwear. 125 That this case wound its controversial 
way to the Supreme Court is astounding. 
Of course, lawyers are to blame for these problems. Professional 
educators, for the most part, have never assumed that they have 
discretion to do as they please with children's rights. Unfortunately, the 
occasional school official does, and the courts approve that behavior, 
reducing both students' rights and their teachers' duties to a caricature, 
like Washington Irving's Ichabod Crane. 126 If the lawyers would listen 
to the educators, they might learn about professional nortns and the outer 
boundaries of institutional behavior. 
IV. RELYING ON THE EXPERTS 
Upon the subject of education ... I can only say that I view it as the most 
important subject which we as a people may be engaged in. 
-Abraham Lincoln 127 
Rigidly applying in loco parentis to public schools comforted courts 
that they were not stepping on schools' discretion. The result, however, 
has been an abandonment of the law to the vagaries of school officials 
characteristics of the school environment'' is hardly better than in loco parentis: it maintains the reality 
of the in loco parentis test with a fa~ade of having some kind of "educational" quality to it. Indeed, the 
Morse decision would have been better served by simply noting that the school had a disciplinary rule in 
place rather than suggesting that all speech that has something to do with drugs is anathema to the 
"special characteristics of the school environment." 
124. /d. at 404. 
125. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642-43 (2009). 
126. See WASHINGTON IRVING, THE LEGEND OF SLEEPY HOLLOW (David McKay Co. 1928) 
(1820). 
127. Abraham Lincoln, First Political Announcement, Mar. 9, 1832, available at 
http://showcase.netins.net/web/creati ve/1 in co ln/speeches/18 3 2 .htm. 
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who have no guidance from the courts. As a consequence, courts 
determine what in loco parentis means on an ad hoc basis rather than on 
a consistent and rational basis of judging the perfortnance of school 
districts and their employees, especially in light of students' individual 
rights. In loco parentis has always been about the outer limits of power, 
not how to run an institution. Retaining that analysis has benefited 
school boards and school officials who have tested those outer 
boundaries of conduct. This is not to say that those outer boundaries 
should not be tested nor that problematic litigation does not sometimes 
lie at the feet of litigious parents. But more than a fair number of public 
education cases that have reached the appellate courts arose because of 
extreme behavior by school officials. In an inordinate number of cases, 
that behavior has been sanctioned by courts that treat those decisions 
with undue respect. 
The consequences for students have been enormous, from increasing 
restrictions on student speech to loosening restrictions on how schools 
can conduct student searches. Schools have been given license to reach 
the outer boundaries of control by courts' countenancing institutional 
and official behavior that is farther and farther from the reaches of 
professional conduct. Conversely, students do not enjoy the 
concomitant protections for their safety in such things as sexual 
harassment and bullying. While schools are afforded greater protections 
from liability for affirmative disciplinary actions, they are also afforded 
greater protections when they fail to protect students because protecting 
students is not within the purview of this U.S. version of in loco 
parentis. In other words, the courts and the Supreme Court in 
particular are making law in accord with ill-advised school 
administrators, not good school administrators. 
In loco parentis has been rekindled for a couple of reasons. First, it is 
a familiar doctrine most adaptable to acconunodating the outdated 
notion that schools are analogous to parenting so, if parents' duties and 
responsibilities have few limits, then schools' do too. As the reasoning 
goes, if the courts give schools all the power that parents have, then 
society will not have all these discipline problems. That is wishful 
thinking. Saying it does not make it so and seems like legislating 
futilely from the bench. Exhorting good behavior from the bench does 
not translate well into the trenches. Discipline problems in schools are 
not so easily solved, and rewarding inappropriate educational 
administrative practices does not solve those discipline problems. 
Second, schools are asked to do too much that is outside their original 
purview yet are constantly scrutinized by parents and other stakeholders. 
That courts give schools so little guidance on these legal matters is not 
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helpful. Schools are expected to do innumerable things that are essential 
to their charges' upbringing and future: "The process of educating our 
youth for citizenship in public schools is not confined to books, the 
curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by example the 
shared values of a civilized social order." 128 To a certain degree, 
schools have been put in the position, by default, of being both parent 
and educator, but that position is not the same as being the parent with 
unlimited discretion. In addition, the government has imposed on 
schools the responsibility of being the drug police: "Congress has 
declared that part of a school's job is educating students about the 
dangers of illegal drug use. It has provided billions of dollars to support 
state and local drug-prevention programs." 129 Along with multiple other 
federal and state statutes imposing duties that are not necessarily 
education-related, Congress imposed the disastrous No Child Left 
Behind Act, which as if schools do not have enough to worry about-
threatens schools with loss of funds if their students do not reach 
prescribed levels of proficiency in targeted academic disciplines. 130 
Tack onto that a parental rights movement that feels an obligation to tell 
schools what to teach their children and a Court that recently devalued 
the government employee to voicelessness, 131 it is a wonder there is 
anybody left who would want to teach at all. 
Given these issues, it is surprising that more cases of bad school 
officials' behavior have not surfaced. Thus, if the cases the Court is 
deciding on this absurd proposition are the minority, what is the majority 
of school officials doing right? And if the majority is doing it right, 
should courts adopt their strategies as guidance for those who are not? 
Why not abandon the descriptive (and basically obsolete) doctrine of in 
loco parentis and follow a more normative standard by which schools 
128. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. 
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both 
demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It 
is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in 
the anned forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal 
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later 
professional training, and in helping him to adjust nonnally to his environment. In these 
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is 
denied the opportunity of an education. 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
129. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007). 
130. Gershon M. Ratner, Why the No Child Left Behind Act Needs to Be Restroctured to 
Accomplish Its Goals and How to Do It, 9 UDC/DCSL L. REv. 1, 3-5, 8-9 (2007). 
131. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 54 7 U.S. 41 0 (2006); see Susan P. Stuart, Citizen Teacher: Damned If 
You Do. Damned If You Don't, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1281 (2008). 
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can anticipate how to govern themselves and parents have leverage 
when schools go astray? 
Such a standard would derive not from a parental delegation of 
authority but from a public delegation of authority. The power of 
today's school district is no longer that of the personal and moral 
convictions that might have informed the schoolmaster in a one-room 
schoolhouse. Instead, "[t]oday's public school officials . . . act in 
furtherance of publicly mandated educational and disciplinary 
policies." 132 These mandates, as well as the constructs endorsed by 
education, sociological, and psychological sources, would better serve 
students and court decisions by establishing the norms of acceptable 
school governance rather than by following the in loco parentis doctrine. 
At their best, these norms would keep school districts out of litigation. 
On the other hand, expert witnesses could establish such norn1s when a 
school district's abuse of those nonns is in court. 133 
Normative behavior is one of the fundamentals of teacher preparation. 
Teachers have norms to follow in measuring their students' 
achievement, to measure the effectiveness of their instruction, and in 
complying with state law certification, as well any other number of 
federal- and state-mandated standards. The No Child Left Behind Act is 
all about norms. Teachers have norms to follow in curriculum 
development, professional development, and classroom management. 
Teachers must follow standards and guidelines, and educational 
administrators are versed even more completely in normative behavior. 
Logging on to the website of any professional school of education 
reveals numerous courses devoted to norms. 134 Perhaps more 
specifically, national professional education and school board 
associations have codes of ethics that emphasize students' civil rights. 135 
132. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,336 (1985). 
133. In fact, the Supreme Court recently relied on nonnative research from education experts to 
support its restrictions on strip searches: ~'The reasonableness of [Redding's) expectation ... [of 
privacy] is indicated by the consistent experiences of other young people similarly searched .... [A] 
number of communities have decided that strip searches in schools are never reasonable and have 
banned them no matter what the facts may be .... " Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. 
Ct. 2633, 2641-42 (2009). 
134. E.g., Ind. U. Sch. of Educ., Teacher Leader Program, 
http:/ I education. indiana. edu/ e I ps!Educational Leadersh i prf eacherLeaderPro gram/tabid/ 1 020 1/Default.as 
px; U. of Ill. Coli. of Educ., Educ. Org. & Leadership, 
http://courses.illinois.edu/cis/2009/spring/schedule!EOL/index.htm.l?skinld=2169. 
135. Nat'l Ass'n of Secondary Sch. Principals, Ethics for School Administrators, 
http://www.principals.org/Content.aspx?topic=47104; Nat'l Educ. Ass'n, Code of Ethics, 
http://www.nea.org/home/30442.htm; NAT'L SCH. BDS. ASS'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR 
SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS, http://www.nsba.org/MainMenu/Governance/ 
OtherBoardlssuesResourcesandReportsonSchoolGovernance/CodeofEthicsforSchoolBoardMembers.asp 
X. 
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In light of this exposure, the suggestions that follow are not new to 
educational professionals although they might be strange and mysterious 
to some school boards and their lawyers. They are nevertheless much 
easier to follow and understand for teachers and school administrators. 
In addition, they conform to an institutional framework for guidance, not 
an ephemeral parental-custodial role. Schools have many more 
responsibilities and duties than parents so their norms must be 
institution-specific and reflective of professionally run enterprises, not 
of a loosely governed home-school paradigm. In acknowledgement of 
those realties, courts must move past Victorian (and even colonial) ideas 
of school organization and leadership and recognize school districts are 
entities that can follow, and would probably welcome, better legal 
guidance than the in loco parentis doctrine from the courts. 
The following objective nortns of educational professionalism may 
inforrn courts about what professional educators can do. Evidence of 
such norrns would allow courts to judge school district behavior against 
an objective standard. Furthermore, these norms are widely accepted 
and can be attested to by an expert educational witness. 
First, courts can judge schools by their rules. School districts must 
have an environment that reflects and enforces their rules. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that behavior that violates school 
rules is an appropriate basis for discipline. 136 Most school districts 
strive for this type of environment because it is the only way the 
institution can survive. State statutes and regulations require such rules. 
School districts that fail to have a regularized disciplinary code and clear 
school rules should not be rewarded with an amorphous, discretionary 
standard under the "special characteristics of the school environment" 
test. That judicial test says nothing that professional educators do not 
already know and fails to establish guidelines. States require schools to 
draft rules of conduct, rules that provide notice to students of the 
behavior that will not be tolerated in schooL These rules are usually 
formulated for student handbooks and distributed to students and parents 
each year for purposes of due process notice. Professional school 
districts do several things with those rules, which should be followed by 
all school districts: (1) The rules must be current with both the law and 
professional literature, and must go through the appropriate internal 
review process and, when necessary, the appropriate public review 
process for public comment; (2) counsel must regularly review the rules 
in light of the current law and the professional literature, and should 
explain what they mean to all the stakeholders; (3) the school district 
136. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 336. 
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must assure the best method of dissemination of these rules to students 
and parents; and (4) teachers and staff must be familiar with the rules 
and be instructed on how they must enforce the rules. So long as the 
rules pass legal muster, the courts have better guidance about the school 
district's professionalism and leave little to the school district's 
unbridled discretion. 
Second, the school districts must have an environment that reflects 
and enforces the basic welfare of their students. This objective leaves 
less discretion for the courts than appears at first blush. It means that 
school districts must draft not just standards for prohibiting bad behavior 
to avoid discipline, but also guidelines that reflect a higher order of 
behavior. 137 A school is fundamentally avoiding its basic educational 
mission if it does not have both aspirations and prohibitions for its 
students. These aspirations must reflect the needs of a safe environment 
and current civil rights laws. A school district that intends to defend its 
disciplinary actions as part of its educational mission must articulate that 
mission. That mission includes, as the Court has rightly suggested, that 
"schools must teach by example the shared values of a civilized social 
order. Consciously or otherwise, teachers and indeed the older 
students demonstrate the appropriate form of civil discourse and 
political expression by their conduct and deportment in and out of 
class."138 The whole package is required, not just the disciplinary ann 
of the state but also the tutelary arm of the state. Again, most school 
districts understand the need for these aspirations, but they often fall 
short of following through. These policies, if put into evidence in court, 
would indicate whether the school district really is engaging in its 
educational mission and whether to give the school the benefit of the 
doubt when it comes before the court because of its disciplinary actions. 
These policies would allow courts to say with some authority that the 
schools' acts conform to professional educational standards. 
Third, in the absence of a school rule that applies or might otherwise 
affect a constitutional right imbued on a student, the Tinker doctrine 
should be revived as a normative rule of school district conduct. If 
student behavior does not "materially disrupt[] classwork or involve[] 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others,"139 then the 
137. See, e.g., BYBEE & GEE, supra note 66, at 217 44. 
138. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) 
139. Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). The irony is that 
the Court is trying to move away from the Tinker rule for reasons that are not entirely clear but seem 
designed to give more flexibility for schools to do strange things in which the Court chooses not to 
interfere. The irony is that school districts are finding themselves having to go back to the Tinker model 
to deal with off-campus, online speech that does not otherwise come within the "special characteristics" 
of the institution nor otherwise have an immediate effect on the educational mission of the school but 
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school district must ignore the small stuff. Most school districts 
probably follow this rule of thumb anyway so why courts find it so 
difficult to apply to schools is a mystery. Students will not behave 
perfectly, and schools are prepared to deal with that truth, perhaps more 
so than courts. But making students subject to discipline that has no 
rationale is not a good model of school management. Why courts would 
assume that school districts would, similarly, behave better without 
clearer guidance is also perplexing. Besides, neither of these positions 
will force parents to become more involved in civilizing their children or 
imposing consequences for bad behavior at home. So long as schools 
are saddled with the task of "inculcating fundamental values necessary 
to the maintenance of a democratic political system,'' they should have 
standards and guidelines that courts should require they follow in their 
disciplinary decisions. 
A fourth objective guideline is reliance on best educational practices. 
These practices may be internal, institutional guidelines, but there are 
many professional education leaders and texts that outline how to run a 
good school. Accreditation agencies judge school districts' best 
practices, and professional employees are subject to review on their best 
practices. The resources on these objective guidelines are easily 
accessible and easily understandable. 140 Thousands of school 
administrators follow them daily. Surely, school districts can explain 
these to courts so they can be understood. 
The fifth, and overarching, principle is assessing the school district's 
ability to conduct itself as a democratic institution. Indeed, the Court's 
charge to schools in Fraser is to inculcate democratic principles in their 
students; democratic education is a primary function of schools. As a 
consequence, schools must "walk the walk." This is not to say that 
courts can or should second-guess a school board's organizational 
scheme, but if litigation arises because the school district has failed to 
conduct itself as a democratic institution, then the school board's ability 
to run the institution becomes fair game. This objective norm is widely 
touted in the literature as one of the most effective ways to run a modem 
school district and anticipates a collaborative rather than a hierarchical 
organization, sharing leadership with community and institutional 
stakeholders. 141 Not only does this model address many of the issues 
that does have a disruptive impact on the school environment. The Bethel Court's in loco 
parentisl"basic educational mission" model is entirely unworkable in these circumstances, being 
descriptive rather than nonnative. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685. 
140. E.g., N. CENT. ASS'N COMM'N ON ACCREDITATION AND SCH. IMPROVEMENT, 
ACCREDITATION STANDARDS FOR QUALITY SCHOOLS (2007), http://www .advanc-
ed. erg/accreditation/ standards/ advanced_schoo ]_standards. pdf. 
141. See, e.g., Frances K. Kochan & Cynthia J. Reed, Collaborative Leadership, Community 
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raised in the No Child Left Behind Act, but it could also weaken 
parental opposition to any particular policy or practice that might 
otherwise be litigated. In fact, this collaborative model is the only one 
that justifies the decision in Vernonia, that the school district 
collaborated with the community to come up with what most 
stakeholders believed was the best way to address a serious and rampant 
drug problem. 142 Recognizing community standards of best practices 
would surely be a much more objective test of the validity of a school 
district's action than courts' continuing to limp along with the broad 
discretionary standard that sprouted from the equally vague in loco 
parentis doctrine. 
These objective standards may be used singularly, in tandem, or for 
particular situations. They are not exclusive, and they might not be 
appropriate in all circumstances. 143 But they are all verifiable and 
subject to proof during the course of litigation. For example, plaintiffs' 
lawyers could call expert witnesses, from any school or department of 
education at a local university, to testify to the best practices of a well-
run school district. Defense lawyers, if they want to justify the school 
district's behavior, might introduce guidelines to support its decision, 
although the likelihood of school boards wanting to voluntarily 
circumscribe their virtually unlimited discretion is probably remote. 
Proof of adherence to, or neglect of, these guidelines would be an issue 
of fact decided by the trier-of-fact to assess the reasonableness of school 
district behavior, particularly in balance against individual student 
rights. If the school district cannot offer proof of its professional school 
environment, then it probably cannot establish a government interest 
sufficient to override an individual student's rights. Judges may finally 
determine that the nearly unbridled discretion given to school boards is 
too broad as a matter of law. 
Part of the problem is that lawyers involved in school litigation want 
to rely on legal concepts rather than concepts from other disciplines. 
That is why courts have been guided by in loco parentis, rather than 
something more practical. There may be any number of reasons for this 
preference although sheer convenience comes to mind. But the 
education profession does not run itself by in loco parentis. Courts 
Building, and Democracy in Public Education, in SAGE HANDBOOK, supra note 67, at 68, 72-74. 
142. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649-50 (1995). 
143. Student searches, especially drug searches, are a unique species of problem that is beyond the 
scope of this Article. Briefly, however, student searches have become a police function that schools 
have undertaken, both voluntarily and involuntarily, and that implicate issues that are tndy outside the 
educational mission of schools. Considering the massive amount of professional education literature 
available, there are likely any number of objective guidelines that school districts can and should follow 
without running afoul of either parents or the law. 
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should not assume so either. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to the authorities who declared the doctrine dead in the 
1980s, in loco parentis remains alive and well, explicitly in student 
search cases and implicitly in student speech cases. The Supreme Court 
led this revival and has given little regard to the doctrine's irrelevance to 
contemporary public education. As the aphorism goes, "bad facts make 
bad law." And the revival of in loco parentis is mired in bad facts. 
Millions of schoolchildren 'have gone through the public schools in the 
past few decades, and hundreds of thousands of teachers and 
administrators have been involve-d with those students. In the greater 
scheme of things, relatively few disputes between schools and students 
reach the courts, particularly appellate courts. To reach such 
"rapprochement," something· must be governing the student-school 
relationships in some pre_dictable and noncontroversial fashion, some 
normative standard that schools, students, and parents use to dispose of 
these disputes. 
Courts, however, have a difficult time deciding these disputes. When 
push comes to shove, they rely on a magnified discretion for school 
districts to know what is best for the educational mission of the schools. 
This discretion is, in no small measure, dependent on the doctrine of in 
loco parentis. Courts are unprepared to question school boards' 
authority for reasons that seem obscure, unless viewed from that 
perspective. Indeed, many cases are taken up on appeal, not because 
there are no institutional norms but because the cases and their facts _are 
of such bizarre proportion that one wonders what the school board was 
thinking in letting it get that far. Perhaps other school administrators are 
thinking the same thing. Rather than regard these cases as outliers and 
as evidence of other administrative problems in the school district, 
courts are wont to be persuaded that these problems are so intractable 
that they are outside their judicial capacity. Of course, there are courts 
who invite that persuasion because it appeals to their sense that 
management is always right. In doing so, these courts put their 
imprimatur on these outliers and the outertnost boundaries of collective 
institutional behavior, not based on any coherent standards but on some 
loosely defined doctrine that allows courts to throw up their collective 
hands and say, "We don't understand how to run schools so we won't 
interfere, regardless of what we really think." 144 This laissez-faire_ 
144. See~ e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 
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judicial attitude invites other school districts to follow suit rather than 
maintain objective, professional norms. To the extent that in loco 
parentis is at the root of these problems, it should be put to death, 
quickly ,and now. 
, 
822, 838 (2002) ("In upholding the constitutionality of the Policy, we express no opinion as to its 
wisdom,. Rather, we hold ,only that [the suspicionless drug-testing] Policy is a reasonable, means of 
furthering the School District's important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its 
schoolchildren." (emphasis added)). 

